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NOTE
The Impact of United States v. Bestfoods on "Owner or
Operator" Liability Under CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Recent Case of United States v. Bestfoods
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.
Bestfoods.' The decision attempted to bring uniformity to the standard for
imposing CERCLA liability on a parent corporation for the release of hazardous
substances by a subsidiary corporation. In Bes(foods, the Court held that the
correct standard for determining direct liability uider the "operator" standard was
"not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but rather whether it operates the
facility, and that operation is evidenced by participation in the activities of the
facility, not the subsidiary."2 This casenote summarizes the tests previously used
in the circuits, the test created in Besyfoods, and the implications of the Supreme
Court's new approach.
B. Enactment of CERCLA
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as a means of dealing with the
clean-up of hazardous waste disposal sites Unlike prior environmental
legislation, CERCLA is not regulatory; it is remedial, requiring those parties
responsible for the hazardous waste releases to pay for the clean-up.
4
CERCLA liability is extensive. In order to establish liability under
CERCLA, the government must prove that: the contaminated site is a facility;
there was a release or threatenedrelease of a hazardous substance; response costs
have been incurred; and that the responsible party is one of the "covered
persons" listed in Section 107(a).- "Facility," "release," and "hazardous
substance" are all defined broadly. "Facility" is defined to include "any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located."6 "Release" is defined to include any
means by which a hazardous substance is released into surface or subsurface
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIMIA LAW REVIEW.
1. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
2. Id. at 1887.
3. See Nurad Inc. v. William B. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992).
4. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985).
5. See Kamie Brown, Parent Corporation Liabiliy for Subsidiary Violations Under §107 of
CERCIA: Responding to United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 1998 B.Y.U. L Rev. 265, 268
(1998).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1995).
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water, land, or ambient air.! "Hazardous substance" includes a comprehensive
list of substances defined as hazardous or toxic under various other environmen-
tal statutes and those that the EPA has specifically identified under CERCLA.8
The "covered persons," commonly called potentially responsible parties,
include the owner or operator of a facility, the owner or operator of a facility at
a time when hazardous substances were disposed, any one who arranges for
disposal or treatment of hazardous substances, and any transporter who selects
a disposal facility.9
C. Owner or Operator Language of Section 107(a)(2)
Courts have wrestled with the question of who qualifies as an "owner or
operator" since CERCLA was enacted. Nowhere is this question more frequently
asked than in the context of parent and subsidiary corporations. Is a parent
corporation an "owner or operator" when its subsidiary is subject to CERCLA
liability?
This question arises because of the lack of precision in the drafting of
CERCLA. The statute defines "owner or operator" as "any person owning or
operating such facility."'" This circular definition gives no insight as to whether
Congress intended to include parent corporations when imposing liability on an
"'owner or operator." An examination of the legislative history of CERCLA also
fails to provide any insight. The statute was hurriedly enacted, and no evidence
exists as to whether Congress intended liability to extend to parent corporations."
Certainly Congress did not intend CERCLA to displace all of the established
principles of corporate law. According to corporate law doctrine, a parent
corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary.' Indeed, the whole of
corporate law is based on the premise of limited liability. On the other hand,
Congress also intended CERCLA to be far-reaching, evidenced by the statute's
broad definitions.'3 Therefore, the question must be answered in light of the
two competing premises-corporate limited liability and CERCLA's expansive
liability.
D. Definition Left to Judicial Determination
Lacking congressional directive, the question of a parent corporation's
liability for the acts of its subsidiary is left to judicial determination. Courts
7. Id. § 9601(22).
8. Id. § 9601(14).
9. Id. § 9607(a).
10. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
11. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-42 (2d Cir. 1985)).
12. The doctrine of corporate veil piercing is an exception to this principle.
13. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990).
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have tended to read "owner or operator" disjunctively and imposed liability if
they find that the parent corporation is either "an owner" or "an operator."'
14
Under this bifurcatedtest, courts applied the corporate law theory of veil piercing
to determine whether a parent corporation qualified as "an owner."' 5 Then, if
they did not find owner liability, they would determine if the party was liable as
an operator. On this second question, the lower federal courts failed to reach a
consensus and the United States Supreme Court resolved the conflict in United
States v. Besffoods. 6 But before addressing the decision in Bestfoods, it is
necessary to look at prior jurisprudence and consider the different tests used in
the circuits.
11. PRIOR JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Different Tests
The circuits articulate three different tests for resolving the operator issue:
the control test, the actual control test, and the Joslyn test. The first two tests
define operator broadly and focus on the relationship between the parent and its
subsidiary. The third test narrowly defines operator so as to write it almost
completely out of the statute.
B. Focusing on Operator: A Parent Corporation's Control of Its Subsidiary
1. Authority-to-Control Test
Some circuits adopted the "authority to control" test to determine operator
liability. Under this test, an entity is deemed to be an operator for purposes of
liability if it could have controlled the hazardous waste activities of its
subsidiary.". Predictably, the authority to control test has been criticized as
"unduly broad" and "overinclusive."'
Is
One of the first cases to deal with operator liability, United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,19 involved an individual who
was an officer and shareholder of a corporation, rather than a parent corporation.
The district court did not bifurcate the analysis into owner liability and operator
liability and it made no veil piercing analysis but instead, considered both owner
and operator under an operator test. It defined "owner and operator" in terms
14. Id. at 26.
15. The courts have not, however agreed as to whether they should apply federal law or state
law to make the determination. See United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1877 n.9 (1998).
16. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
17. See Infra text accompanying note 24.
18. See Erika Birg, Redefining "Owner or Operator" under CERCLA to Preserve Traditional
Notions of Corporate Law, 43 Emory LJ. 771, 810 (1984).
19. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985).
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of capacity to control, rather than the exercise of actual control. Many courts
faced with the question of parent corporation liability as owners or operators use
the NEPACCO 120 court's analysis21 even though the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court's holding on the owner or operator liability issue. The court
did not comment on the lower court's substantive reasoning because it found the
specific application of the statutory language incorrect.' Specifically, it
reversed the trial court because neither the officer/shareholdernor the corporation
owned or operated the "facility."'
Idaho v. Bunker Hill" is the only case to apply the authority-to-control test
to a parent corporation. In Bunker Hill, the state brought an action against a
parent corporation (Gulf) and its subsidiary (Bunker Hill), alleging violations of
CERCLA. Gulf contended that Bunker Hill owned and operated the facility in
question. The court failed to bifurcate "owner or operator" and analyzed "owner
or operator" as one test, the operator test.2S  It relied on United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.26 which held that anyone
who owns an interest in a facility and is actively participating in its management
can be held liable.2 Based on the holding of Northeastern Pharmaceutical, the
court defined "owner-operator" as anyone who "has power to direct the activities
of persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution."2S The court
noted that Gulf's approval was necessary before $500.00 could be spent on
pollution matters, Gulf obtained weekly reports of the day-to-day aspects of
Bunker Hill's operations, and Bunker Hill's net worth was only $1100.00 after
it paid $27 million to Gulf in dividends.29 Based on these facts, the court
concluded Gulf had the capacity to control disposal and releases and could be
held liable as an "owner or operator".30
Nurad v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co." is a Fourth Circuit case that
discusses the authority to control test. Although Nurad did not involve a parent-
subsidiary relationship, it dealt with the question of who qualifies as an "owner
or operator". The current owner of the property (Nurad) brought an action
against previous tenants for reimbursement of costs incurred in removing
20. NEPACCO I is the anacronim for the district court proceedings in Northeastern.
21. See Lynda Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA:
Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 Wash. U. LQ. 223, 240 (1994).
22. Id. at 239.
23. Id.
24. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
25. Based on the facts about Gulfs control, it is highly probable that if the court would have
considered the owner test, it would have found grounds to pierce the corporate veil.
26. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (dealt with the liability of a vice-president and major
stockholder as an owner or operator).
27. Id.
28. Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
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underground storage tanks and their hazardous contents from the property. The
court focused on the term "operator" and held that the correct standard was
whether the defendants had the authority to control the facility.32 The court
held that the tenants were not operators because they "lacked authority to control
the operations or decisions involving the disposal of hazardous substances at the
site .... ."" While the court cited Bunker Hill,3 it applied the test to exclude
liability, not to impose it.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the authority-to-control test in Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.35 There, the city sued a prior
owner of property to recover the costs of removing contaminated soil from the
property. The prior owner filed a third party claim against the excavator,
alleging that the excavator exacerbated the extent of the contamination by
spreading contaminated soil over the uncontaminated areas of the property. The
excavator argued that he did not qualify as an operator for purposes of liability.
The court rejected his argument and, citing Nurad, held that operator liability
attaches "if the defendant had authority to control the cause of the contamination
at the time the hazardous substances were released into the environment.
36
The court concluded that the excavator's operations on the property tended to
show that he had sufficient control over the particular phase of development to
be an operator.
2. Actual Control Test
Other circuits have rejected the authority-to-control test. These circuits
refuse to impose liability merely because a parent has the authority to control its
subsidiary, holding that a parent corporation must exhibit actual control over its
subsidiary before operator liability attaches. This approach is known as the
actual control test.
The First Circuit adopted the control test in United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp." The United States government brought a CERCLA claim against
Kayser-Roth, alleging that the corporation was responsible for the cleanup costs
incurred by the EPA at a mill owned by a subsidiary, Stamina Mill, Inc. Kayser-
Roth claimed that it could not as a matter of law be held liable as an operator
or as an owner. Without discussing the owner prong of the statute, the court
began its analysis by considering whether the definition of operator allowed a
parent corporation to be held liable as an operator of a subsidiary corporation."
After concluding that it did, the court addressed whether Kayser-Roth was an
32. Id. at 842.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 1341.
37. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
38. Id. at 26-27.
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operator. The court rejected the authority-to-control test because, "[t]o be an
operator requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant
general authority or ability to control that comes with ownership." 9 Instead,
the court held that "[a]t a minimum [liability] requires active involvement in the
activities of the subsidiary."4 It then examined the degree of control Kayser-
Roth had over Stamina Mills to determine if the requisite "active involvement"
was present. Kayser-Roth had monetary control over Stamina Mills; it restricted
Stamina Mill's financial budget; it directed that environmental matters be funded
through Kayser-Roth; it had to approve buying or selling of real estate by
Stamina Mills; and it placed its own personnel in director and officer positions
at Stamina Mills."' These facts led to the conclusion that Kayser-Roth was an
operator. In an important footnote, the court said that control decisions about
hazardous waste were indicative of the type of control necessary but it alone was
not enough; other indicia of pervasive control must exist.4z
In the Third Circuit case, Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli
Corp.,43 the plaintiff discovered that a lot adjacent to the groundwater
production which had formerly been a lead smelting plant was contaminating the
water wells. The Authority brought a CERCLA claim against the company that
had owned the lead plant, Tonolli PA, and its parent corporation, Tonolli
Canada. TonoUi Canada contended that it was not an "owner or operator" for
purposes of CERCLA liability. The court began its analysis by noting that
"owner" and "operator" denote two different concepts and require two different
standards.' The court then addressed the operator question. It adopted the
actual control test because it considered the authority-to-control test too broad.
The actual control standard "appears to strike the appropriate middle ground,
balancing the benefits of limited liability with CERCLA's remedial purposes."45
One factor to consider when determining if a corporation has exerted
sufficient control to warrant imposition of operator liability is the extent of the
parent corporation's day-to-day involvement in the subsidiary's operations and
policy-making decisions." Analyzing the case before it, the lower court
recognized that the corporations' lead smelting processes were not dependent on
one another, that each owned its own equipment and procured its own raw
materials, and that all transactions between the two corporations were on an
arm's length basis.4 The appellate court, however, focused on the facts that
Tonolli Canada was the sole shareholder of Tonolli PA and that the two
39. Id. at 27.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 24 and n.8.
43. 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 1220.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1222.
47. Id. at 1223.
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companies shared a president and chief financial officer. Although shared
officers without more are not enough to impute liability, that fact did raise
questions. Moreover, Tonolli Canada's vice-president of manufacturing
occasionally served as Tonolli PA's plant manager. The court said that his role
in environmental decisions at the Tonolli site could be significant." Ultimately,
the court remanded the case for the district court to determine if Tonolli Canada
exerted sufficient control over Tonolli PA based on the role of several Tonolli
Canada officers.
The Second Circuit also adopted the actual control test. In Shiavone v.
Pearce,4 9 the owner of contaminated property brought suit to recover cleanup
costs from a corporation whose wholly owned subsidiary had operated the
facility. The court began its analysis of "owner or operator" by noting that
liability may be imposed directly (under the "operator" standard) or indirectly
(by piercing the corporate veil under the "owner" standard), 0 In discussing the
propriety of imposing "operator" liability on a parent corporation, the court relied
on both legislative intent and the statutory language. It stated that proof of
parent operator liability "looks to the independent actions of the parent
corporation, evidenced through its control over the polluting site."5 ' It is
important to note that the court claimed to subscribe to the views in Kayser-Roth,
but the test in Kayser-Roth was whether the parent corporation had actual control
over the subsidiary, 2 while the test employed in Shiavone was whether the
parent corporation had control over the polluting site.
C. Focusing on Owner: Limiting Liability to Piercing the Corporate Veil
Some courts have taken a completely different approach. They have
basically read out the "operator" part of the statute and focused on the "owner"
standard and the doctrine of veil piercing. These courts read "operator" very
narrowly and only apply it in very limited circumstances.
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc.,53 a prior owner
(Joslyn) sued its predecessor's parent corporation (T.L. James), seeking
contribution for cleanup costs. The district court granted T.L. James' motion for
summary judgment, concluding that CERCLA was not intended to be an
exception to the general rule in corporation law of limited liability.' Josyin
appealed. The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by looking at the definition of
"owner or operator" and acknowledging that several courts had extended liability
48. Id. at 1224.
49. 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 252.
51. Id. at 254 (citations and footnote omitted).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
53. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
54. Id. at 81-82.
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to parent corporations."5 The court, however, refused to follow the other
circuits, reasoning that "CERCLA does not define 'owners' or 'operators' as
including the parent company of offending wholly owned subsidiaries. Nor does
the legislative history indicate that Congress intended to alter so substantially a
basic tenet of corporation law."' 6 The court said that if Congress wanted to
extend liability to parent corporations, it was free to do so at any time. Also, of
importance to the court was the fact that Congress had in fact adopted a
"control" test in the next part of the statute that defined "owner or operator" for
facilities conveyed to the state or local government.5 " That definition reads,
"[A]ny person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such
facility."" This "control" language is absent from the general definition of
"owner or operator," suggesting that Congress did not intend mere control to be
sufficient to impose liability on a previous owner or operator of an onshore
facility.s9 The court went on to consider piercing the corporate veil and asked
the question whether the corporate entity was a sham used to perpetrate a fraud
or avoid personal liability. Concluding that it was not, the court affirmed the
district court's holding and refused to extend liability to the parent corpora-
tion."
In United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.,6 the United States filed suit
under CERCLA to recover past and future cleanup costs of soil, surface water,
and ground waters surrounding a dormant chemicalmanufacturing plant. Among
those sued were two parent corporations whose subsidiaries had owned the
chemical plant. The parents contended that they were not "owners or operators"
for the pdrpose of imposing liability. The court began its analysis by considering
the enactment and purposes of CERCLA. It said that the statute should be
construed so that those responsible for the environmental problems were
responsible for cleanup but that "the widest net possible ought not be cast in
order to snare those who are either innocently or tangentially tied to the facility
at issue."62 It criticized the district court's application of the "control" test as
an undefined "new, middle ground" and advocated what it considered a more
predictable test, the corporate veil piercing doctrine.63 It envisioned use of the
"operator" standard in situations where "a parent might independently operate the
facility in the stead of its subsidiary; or, as a sort of joint venturer, actually
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 83.
58. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XAXiii) (1995 and Supp. 1998) (emphasis in original)
(alteration in original)).
59. See the definition of "owner or operator" given in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XAXii) (1995 and
Supp. 1998).
60. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83-84.
61. 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. CL 1876 (1998).
62. Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d at 578.
63. Id. at 579-80.
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operate the facility alongside its subsidiary."" The court then decided that the
parent corporation's involvement did not warrant veil piercing.
6s
III. FACTS OF UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Besifoodsy7 to
settle the dispute between the circuits as to what standard to apply to
determine when a parent corporation is an operator for purposes of
CERCLA liability. In 1957, a chemical manufacturing company, Ott
Chemicals (Ott I) opened a plant near Muskegon, Michigan. It both
intentionally and unintentionally dumped hazardous waste that polluted the
soil and ground water at the site.68  In 1965, CPC International, Inc.
contracted to buy the plant. CPC formed a wholly owned subsidiary
which it named Ott Chemical Co. (Ott U). Ott II continued chemical
manufacturing at the plant and continued to dump hazardous waste.69 In
1972, CPC sold Ott II to Story Chemical Co., which operated the plant
until Story's bankruptcy in 1977. Eventually, the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources investigated the site and discovered the extensive
environmental damage. It sought a buyer for the property who would
contribute to the cleanup costs. Aerojet General Corporation arranged to
acquire the property from Story Chemical's bankruptcy trustee later that
same year. It formed a wholly owned California subsidiary, Cordova
Chemical Company (Cordova CA) to purchase the property. Cordova CA,
in turn, created a wholly owned Michigan subsidiary, Cordova Chemical
Company of Michigan (Cordova MI) which manufactured chemicals at the
site until 1986.70
By 1981, the EPA had begun investigating and cleaning up the site. It spent
tens of millions of dollars in the process and then brought suit under Section 107
of CERCLA to recover some of the costs.71 It sued Arnold Ott (the original
shareholder and president of Ott 1),fl CPC, Aerojet, Cordova CA, and Cordova
MI. 3 The parties stipulated that the Muskegon plant was a "facility" within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), that there had been a "release" of a "hazardous
substance," and that the United States had incurred reimbursable response costs
in cleaning up the site. The remaining question was whether CPC and Aerojet,
64. Id. at 579.
65. Id. at 581.
66. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
67. The company changed its name from Cordova Chemical to 'Bestfoods" before certiorari
was granted.
68. Besgfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1882.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1882-83.
72. See id. at 1882.
73. See id. at 1883.
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as the parent corporations of Ott H and the Cordova Companies, had "owned or
operated" the facility with the meaning of Section 107(a)(2).'
The district court held that each of the parent corporations could be held
liable either as an operator if it operated the facility, or as an owner through the
doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil." It applied the actual control test to
determine operator liability. "[A] parent corporation is directly liable... as an
operator only when it has exerted influence over its subsidiary by actively
participating in and exercising control over the subsidiary's business during a
period of disposal of hazardous waste."' 5 Under this standard, the district court
held that both CPC and Aerojet were liable as operators.76 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision in part and applied a more stringent test
for determining operator liability.'
The Supreme Court acceptedthe principle that "owner" and "operator" were
distinct terms and that each had its own test. The Court agreed with the Sixth
Circuit that "a participation-and-control test looking to the parent's supervision
over the subsidiary, especially one that assumes that dual officers always act on
behalf of the parent, cannot be used to identify [the] operation of a facility
resulting in direct parental liability.'7  However, the Court felt that the Sixth
Circuit had unduly limited "operator" when it confined it to situations of direct
parental operation due to exclusive or joint ventures.79 In a unanimous opinion,
the Court held that the correct question for determining direct liability under the
operator standard was "not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but rather
whether it operates the facility, and that operation is evidenced by participation
in the activities of the facility, not the subsidiary."8
IV. ANALYSIS
4. Ownership Liabilit--A Look at General Corporate Law
The Court began its analysis by looking at the general principals of corporate
law. It noted that traditionally a parent is not responsible for the acts of its
subsidiaries and that hornbook law directs that "the exercise of the 'control'
which stock ownership gives to the stockholders ... will not create liability
beyond the assets of the subsidiary."'" "Control" includes things such as
74. See id.
75. Id. (quoting CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D. Mich.
1991)).
76. See Beitfoods, 118 S. CL at 1883.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64, discussing the court of appeals decision, United
States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
78. Bes/bods, 118 S. CL at 1889.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1887 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1884 (citation omitted).
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election of directors, the making of by-laws, and other acts incident to the status
of stockholders. The Court then discussed the doctrine of corporate veil piercing
and found it is appropriate to pierce the veil when "the corporate form would
otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably
fraud, on the shareholder's behalf."' Nothing in CERCLA indicates that these
basic principles of corporate law were to be replaced and absent some directive
in the statute, the Court could not abrogate these principals.
9 3 Only when the
corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be held indirectly liable
as an owner.V
B. Operator Liability
In addressing the question of liability based on operation, the court
found that a difference existed between operator liability, which is direct
liability for one's own actions, and owner liability, which is indirect
liability based on veil piercing. "The fact that a corporate subsidiary
happens to own a polluting facility operated by its parent does nothing...
to displace the rule that the parent 'corporation is [itself] responsible for
the wrongs committed by its agents in the course of its business."'
3 5
The court then addressed the question of what constitutes direct parental
operation.
I. Definition of "Operator"
The Court began its analysis of the operator standard with the statutory
definition of "operator" as "'any person... operating' the facility."
6 Finding
the statutory definition unhelpful, the Court turned to the ordinary meaning of
the word, which is "to control the functioning of; run."
3
" The Court concluded
that under CERCLA an operator is "simply someone who directs the workings
of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility.""
3  The "operator must
manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution" (i.e.
operations having to do with disposal or leakage of hazardous waste and
compliance with environmental regulations). 9
82. Id. at 1885.
83. Id.
84. See Id. at 1885-86. In a footnote, the Court recognized the lack of uniformity as to whether
the courts should apply federal veil piercing law or state veil piercing law. But because the issue was
not before the Court, it declined to address it. Id. at 1885 n.9.
85. Id. at 1886 (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 1887 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XAXii) (1995 and Supp. 1998)).
87. Bessfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887 (quoting the American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d ed.
1992)).




2. Actual Control Test
With this definition in hand, the Court then considered the actual control test
and found that it incorrectly fused direct and indirect liability." With the actual
control test, the focus of the inquiry of owner liability and operator liability is
the same; they both focus on the relationship between the two corporations. 9,
However, the test for operator liability should not focus on the relationship
between the parent and its subsidiary; instead, it should focus on the relationship
between the parent and the actual facility that is causing the pollution.9
"Control of the subsidiary, if extensive enough, gives rise to indirect liability
under [veil] piercing doctrine, not direct liability under the statutory lan-
guage."93 Under this analysis, the district court was wrong to focus on CPC's
active participation and control over Ott H's board of directors; the focus should
have been CPC's control over the chemical manufacturing plant itself.
3. Dual Officers
Next, the Court addressed the district court's analysis of the dual officers
and directors at CPC and Ott H."' The district court had emphasized that CPC
placed its own officials on Ott ]I's board of directors and that these directors
made the day-to-day operating policies of the facility.95 The United States
Supreme Court stated that this type of control was entirely proper and directors
of a parent corporation often served as directors of a subsidiary. This degree of
control is not enough to expose the parent corporation to liability for acts of its
subsidiary. The Court noted that it was a well-establishedprinciple that directors
and officers holding dual positions "change hats" to represent the two corpora-
tions separately.96 It said that the government would have to rebut this
presumption and show that the officers and directors were acting in their
capacities as CPC officers and directors, and not as Ott H officers and directors,
when they committed the acts.97 The Court concluded its discussion of the
district court's application of the actual control test by saying that the actual
control test and its focus on dual officers would leave the possibility of indirect
liability under veil piercing a purely academic question. "There would in essence
be a relaxed, CERCLA-specific rule of derivative liability that would banish
traditional standards and expectations from the law of CERCLA liability."98
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1888.
93. Id. at 1887 (citation omitted).




98. Id. at 1889.
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4. Limitation of "Operator" Liability to Joint Ventures
Although the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the actual
control test, it found that the appellate court had "stopped short" when it
confined its examples of direct liability to exclusive or joint ventures." The
Court determined that there are other instances where the dual officers and
directors could go beyond the norms of parental influence."e It also suggested
another possibility-when an agent of the parent that has no position in the
subsidiary corporation manages or directs activities at the facility. Activities
consistent with a parent corporation's investor status such as monitoring
performance, supervision of finances, and capital budget decisions should not
give rise to direct liability, but when actions directed at the facility by an agent
of the parent are "eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility," imposing liability may be appropriate."' Because the
Sixth Circuit's analysis was very similar to that of the Fifth Circuit in Joslyn, the
Court effectively overruled Joslyn and its narrow reading of "operator."
5. Application to the Facts of the Case
Some evidence existed that some of CPC's activities at the Muskegon plant
went beyond the accepted norms. 2 CPC's governmental and environmental
affairs director (Williams) had no position at Ott II but some facts suggested that
he played a part in dealing with toxic risks emanating from operation of the
plant.' The district court found that he "actively participated in and exerted
control over a variety of Ott II environmental matters" and "issued directives
regarding Ott II's responses to regulatory inquiries.""' Based on this
information, the Court remanded so that the district court could determine, based
on its analysis, Williams' role and the role of any other CPC agent who might
have had a part in operating the Muskegon facility.'
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND FUTURE COMPLICATIONS
A. The Authority to Control Test
The Court never explicitly addressed the authority-to-control test adopted in





103. See id. at 1890.
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because the district court in Bestfoods had adopted the actual control test and
never discussed the authority to control test. Another possibility is that the Court
considered the authority to control test in the parent corporation context too
tenuous because only one court, a: district court, had used it in that context.
The Court's criticism of the actual control test focused on its fusion of direct
and indirect liability.'06 Courts which had applied the actual control test had
asked whether the parent corporation was actively involved in the activities of
its subsidiary, rather than whether it was involved in the activities of the
facility. 017 But the test applied by courts adopting the authority-to-control test
does not focus on the activities directed towards the subsidiary. Rather it focuses
on the "mechanisms causing pollution," "decisions... at the site" and "cause of
the contamination."'05 For example, in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co.,'"9 the court focused on "authority to control the operations or
decisions involving the disposal of hazardous substances ... .""' Therefore,
arguably, the authority-to-control test does not suffer from the same flaws as the
actual control test. It is still doubtful, however, that the authority-to-control test
would survive under the Court's analysis in Besffoods because the actual control
test was adopted as a more restrictive alternative to the authority-to-control test.
Moreover, the definition of "operator" espoused by the Court excludes the
authority-to-control test."' The Court defined "operator" as "someone who
directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility."'" This
definition connotes actions, not just the power to act. Therefore, the mere power
to act would not be sufficient to invoke operator liability.
B. Implications for Parent Corporations and the Focus of Future Litigation
Limited liability is a hallmark of corporate law. It is expected that a
majority shareholder, such as a parent corporation, will exhibit some control over
its subsidiary. Under the actual control test, a thin line exists between what
constitutes accepted amounts of control and what qualifies the parent corporation
as an operator for purposes of CERCLA liability. As a result, courts almost
always found that a parent corporation qualified as an an operator under the
actual control test. The Court was correct when it criticized the test for fusing
direct and indirect liability. Under the old analysis, a continuum of control
existed with veil piercing at the far end and the actual control test a little to the
left of it. The same type of activities that could result in veil piercing could
result in a finding of actual control with just a slight variation of degree. Now,
106. See supra text accompanying notes 90 and 91.
107. See id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36, discussing the authority-to-control test.
109. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
110. Id. at 842 (quoting lower court opinion).
111. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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under the Court's analysis, a parent corporation need only worry about the
traditional doctrine of veil piercing when it exerts control over the facilities of
its subsidiary, not the vague middle ground of the actual control test. A parent
corporation may look at its degree of control over the facility itself to determine
the possibility of liability.
Unfortunately, the question the Court asks to determine the degree of control
over the facility itself is somewhat vague. The Court said that "[t]he critical
question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an
agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental
oversight of a subsidiary's facility."'" 3 The questions remains as to what
degree and what details are considered "eccentric." The only concrete example
comes from the facts of the case-an employee of the parent corporation
managed and directed activities at the facility and was not employed by the
subsidiary. The Court emphasized that this employee did not just manage and
direct "activities" but he managed and directed environmental "activities."" 4
So a parent corporation should carefully scrutinize its activities with regard to
facilities run by its subsidiaries and ensure that any of its employees involved
with environmental issues at the subsidiary's facility are wearing "two hats."
Despite the rejection of the actual control test, a parent corporation must still
worry about the degree of its involvement with the management and control of
its subsidiary because indirect liability based on the "owner" standard is still
alive. The Court upheld the court of appeals' veil piercing. Thus, a parent
corporation may be charged with derivative liability for its subsidiary's
actions." 5
While the court's decision does bring some clarity and uniformity, the
decision is unlikely to decrease the amount of litigation concerning whether a
parent corporation is an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA liability.
Now, litigation will focus more on the "owner" standard and derivative liability
through veil piercing because the activities that were sufficient to qualify
under the actual control test are the same kinds of activities that implicate
veil piercing. For example, in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,"' the
parent had monetary control over the subsidiary, restricted its financial
budget, directed its environmental matters, and had veto power over its
buying and selling of real estate."' These facts were considered in the
court's analysis of operator liability, but they are the same facts that a
court would consider when piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, many
of the questions will be the same; they will just be asked under a different prong
of the analysis.
113. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 (1998).
114. Id. at 1889-90.
115. Id. at 1885-86.
116. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
117. See Id. at 27.
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C. Soundness of the Decision
Despite the unanswered questions and future complications, the Court's
decision in Besfoods did bring some clarity to the owner or operator determina-
tion and the test it adopts seems to be a logical analysis. Lower courts are no
longer faced with the problem of determining which of the three previous tests
to apply. The Court overruled the actual control test and effectively overruled
the Joslyn test. And, as discussed earlier, the viability of the authority-to-control
test was called into serious question. We are left with one test that looks to a
parent corporation's control over the facility-a test which makes decisions more
predictable. Additionally, this test conforms to the language of the statute which
imposes liability on "any person who... owned or operated anyfacility." 8
VI. CONCLUSION
CERCLA was intended to be a broad statute that imposes liability on those
persons responsible for the release of hazardous substances. It was not intended
to displace established corporate law; namely, the limited liability of parent
corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries. In defining who bears the burden
of CERCLA liability, courts have struggled to find a common ground between
these two conflicting policies. In United States v. Besfoods, the United States
Supremi Court addressed the issue. The Court adopted veil piercing to
determine "owner" liability and defined "operator" as someone who directs the
workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility, thus, clarifying the
tests of "owner" and "operator" under CERCLA and bringing uniformity to the
circuits.
Layna Cook
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX2) (1995 and Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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